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ABSTRACT
This article examines medical decision-making, arguing that the law, properly under-
stood, requires where possible that equal weight be given to the wishes, feelings, beliefs,
and values of patients who have, and patients who are deemed to lack, decision-making
capacity. It responds critically to dominant lines of reasoning that are advanced and ap-
plied in the Court of Protection, and suggests that for patient-centred practice to be
achieved, we do not need to revise the law, but do need to ensure robust interpretation
and application of the law. The argument is based on conceptual analysis of the law’s
framing of patients and medical decisions, and legal analysis of evolving and contempo-
rary norms governing the best interests standard.
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I . INTRODUCTION
This article aims to correct some problematic jurisprudential positions that have de-
veloped in the Court of Protection. It responds in particular to two inﬂuential judg-
ments: Lewison J’s decision in Re P,1 which inter alia purports to explain the ‘general
philosophy’ of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA)2; and Baker J’s ruling in Re M, a
case that reportedly addressed for the ﬁrst time the question of whether the best inter-
ests of a patient in a minimally conscious state (MCS) were not served by continued
provision of life-sustaining food and hydration.3 Baker J’s reasoning, with which this
article directly engages, relies on that of Lewison J. However, it bears noting that a
tension exists between their analyses: Lewison J suggests that the MCA radically re-
formed mental capacity law, while Baker J recognises the MCA as statutory codiﬁca-
tion within an evolving area of legal doctrine.4 Both judges, though, are united in
denying full weight to incapacitated patients’ wishes, feelings, beliefs, and values under
section 4(6) MCA.5 In essence, they hold that the values of patients who lack capacity
cannot be determinative in the way that they are for patients with capacity because
that would mean replacing the best interests standard with a substituted judgment
test. This article challenges their claims.
If successful, the article supports what we may hope is a shift to more appropriate
judicial approaches to section 4(6).6 Furthermore, it substantiates and explicates the
underpinnings to relevant rulings in the Court of Appeal in Burke v GMC7 and the
Supreme Court in Aintree v James,8 the latter of which, as I will argue, seems incom-
patible with P and M. My central claim is that mental capacity law has been devised
with a commitment to achieving patient-centred care; care that honours where possi-
ble the patient’s own, reﬂectively endorsed values, whether or not she has decision-
making capacity. This position is consistent with dominant themes in medical ethics
and law,9 and prevailing national and international discourses.10 I will demonstrate
1 Re P (Statutory Will) [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch); [2010] 2 WLR 253.
2 ibid, paras 36–45.
3 Re M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam);
[2012] 1 WLR 1653.
4 See, respectively, Re P (n 1), para 36 and Re M, ibid, para 85. My own view, explored below, is that the doc-
trine, if not the practice, suggests an evolution of which the MCA forms a part. In regard to patient partici-
pation, including in the application of the patient’s beliefs and values, see also the analysis in Mary
Donnelly, ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2009) 17(1) Med LR 1.
5 Throughout this article, I use ‘values’ to encompass also wishes, feelings, and beliefs: this is for brevity of ex-
pression, and should not be taken to imply a view that these four different concepts are reducible to one.
6 See especially Hayden J’s judgment in another MCS case,M v Mrs N and Others [2015] EWCOP 76, where
a determination was made not to continue provision of treatment because, as held at para 75, ‘it would be
disrespectful to Mrs. N to preserve her further in a manner I think she would regard as grotesque’ (empha-
sis in original).
7 R (On the Application of Oliver Leslie Burke) v The General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003.
8 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67.
9 John Coggon, ‘Assisted Dying and the Context of Debate: ‘Medical Law’ versus ‘End-of-Life Law’ ’ (2010)
18(4) Med LR 541; Richard Huxtable, ‘Autonomy, Best Interests and the Public Interest: Treatment, Non-
treatment and the Values of Medical Law’ (2014) 22(4) Med LR 459; Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall,
‘Autonomy, Capacity and Vulnerable Adults: Filling the Gaps in the Mental Capacity Act’ (2015) 35(4) LS
698.
10 See especially the Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legis-
lative scrutiny (HL 2013-14, 139); United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
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how, all things equal, if a patient’s reﬂectively endorsed view on her interests is known,
legally this should hold equal weight regardless of whether she has capacity or not.
To reach that conclusion, the article aims ﬁrst for conceptual clarity. Section II ex-
plains the falsity of a binary understanding that posits just patients who have, and pa-
tients who lack, capacity. Given the demands of MCA section 4(6), we can
distinguish patients who lack, but once had, relevant capacity, and patients whose val-
ues cannot be ascertained. Section III goes on to consider patient values in relation to
the concept of the medical decision, which requires to be understood by reference to
the multiple ‘stakeholders’ involved in it: the patient herself, the person making the
clinical determination, and the authority responsible for resource allocation. Section
IV then considers judicial interpretations of how best interests should be understood
and applied. It challenges the application of best interests as conceived in Airedale
NHS Trust v Bland,11 suggesting that it is wrong to rely on that case (as Court of
Protection judges continue to do) when giving conceptual form to the contemporary
best interests standard. It then responds to concerns that best interests and substi-
tuted judgment might wrongfully be elided. And ﬁnally, it explains the coherence of
‘objective best interests’ being informed or determined by reference to subjective val-
ues. The article concludes that it is erroneous to suppose that basing a decision on a
patient’s best interests is necessarily something other than deciding in line with what
would have been done if she had capacity, and suggests that we should welcome this.
I I . CONCEPTUAL CLARITY ONE: MENTAL CAPACITY LAW’S
THREE ADULT PATIENTS
An important legal literature examines the concept of the person.12 The implications
of being deemed a legal person are profound: persons enjoy legal rights and protec-
tions, and suffer obligations and liabilities, that do not apply to mere things. Legal
scholarship on personhood examines and incorporates complex philosophical ques-
tions, which stand centre stage in a great deal of medico-legal and bioethical debate.13
At law it makes a difference to particular rights, freedoms, and liabilities if a person is,
for example, an employee, an occupier, a registered medical practitioner, and so on. In
each case, we have a concept whose legal signiﬁcance is of huge import. In the ideal,
we want to be able to justify the creation of the concept, and understand its function
in practice. We want, say, to establish that it is a good idea for the law to recognise a
distinct category called ‘registered medical practitioner’, and to know how her legally
deﬁned position distinguishes itself.
This section of the article conceptually examines ‘adult patients’ in mental capacity
law. The law provides—on its face—two concepts: those who have, and those who
11 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
12 For a clear overview and critical analysis, see Ngaire Nafﬁne, Law’s Meaning of Life (Hart 2009).
13 This is true especially in regard to beginning and end of life questions: see eg the debates between John
Finnis and John Harris in chs 1–6 of John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined (CUP 1997); Sheelagh
McGuinness and Marie Fox, ‘The Politics of Muddling Through: Categorising Embryos’ in Catherine
Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Healthcare Law: Essays in Honour of the Work of Margaret Brazier
(Routledge 2016).
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lack, capacity.14 Section 1(1) MCA stipulates that we should assume that adults have
capacity, and the tests in sections 2 and 3 provide the means by which that assump-
tion might be displaced. Capacity, as is widely observed, is decision-speciﬁc, and in-
vites examination of a patient’s practical reasoning. As such, at any given time
(depending on the circumstances under issue), English law tells us that we may have
one of two patients: either a patient with, or a patient without, capacity.
While this conceptual framing of the patient is not superﬁcial, an examination of
the MCA’s demands, and an analysis of the norms and principles that developed both
pre and post its coming into force, provide a subtler conceptual landscape.15 This is
particularly so given the weight afforded to the patient’s own values, most notably—
but not uniquely—in section 4(6). Without a more reﬁned comprehension of the
concept of the patient, judges risk both overstating the importance of autonomy for pa-
tients who have capacity, and underestimating the weight that should be given to per-
sonal values of patients who lack capacity. Mental capacity law, I suggest, presents
three sorts of patients. First, there are patients who have capacity. Then, within the
band of those who lack capacity, there are two further concepts of the patient: those
who once had relevant capacity but are deemed now to lack it; and those whose val-
ues cannot be (satisfactorily) ascertained. I will consider each category of patient in
turn with reference to some of medical law’s most discussed patients.
A. Patients with Capacity
The patient who has capacity is exempliﬁed in the case of Ms B.16 Here, life-
preserving interventions were found to be unlawful because the patient refused con-
sent to the invasion of her bodily integrity. The court accepted the health-care team’s
good faith in its estimation of Ms B’s best interests (her carers believed that she did
not appreciate that she would come to value her life differently after time, and would
eventually consider continued existence to be worthwhile). However, even where
medical law gives special value to continued life, medico-legal norms have developed
to protect a system of value pluralism, where it is recognised that perspectives on a
person’s moral, social, spiritual, and other interests legitimately vary. Respect should
be given to the speciﬁc patient’s conception of her interests including when her life is
at stake. In Ms B’s case, the court held that she had capacity, and, therefore, that her
view of her interests, and consequent refusal of consent, should prevail over her carers’
view that she failed properly to understand her interests.
14 The conceptual claim here is not unsettled by the judicial activism that has led to the emergence of the cate-
gory of vulnerable adult, who has mental capacity but is nevertheless denied decision-making capacity (see eg
Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage) [2006] 1 FLR 867). There are, however, interesting up-
shots to the Courts’ development of the inherent jurisdiction that warrant analysis that cannot be accommo-
dated in the current article, but see Michael Dunn, Isabel Clare and Anthony Holland, ‘To Empower or to
Protect? Constructing the ‘Vulnerable Adult’ in English Law and Public Policy’ (2008) 28(2) LS 234; Hazel
Biggs and Caroline Jones, ‘Legally Vulnerable: What Is Vulnerability and Who Is Vulnerable?’ in Michael
Freeman, Sarah Hawkes and Belinda Bennett (eds), Law and Global Health (OUP 2014).
15 See also Huxtable (n 9).
16 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam); [2002] 2 All ER 449.
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The strength of the rights of the patient with capacity is great: canonically, she has
an ‘absolute’ right to refuse treatment, or choose between treatments that are offered,
for rational or irrational reasons, or for no reason at all.17 But part of the misunderstand-
ing that this article seeks to correct obtains in judges and scholars imagining that the pa-
tient with capacity is more greatly empowered than the law permits. As such, it is crucial
to note two qualiﬁcations that apply to the ‘autonomy rights’ of patients with capacity.
First, we have the Burke qualiﬁcation.18 In Burke, as in Ms B’s case, there was (po-
tentially) a clash between the patient’s and the health-care team’s assessment of what
would serve the patient’s interests. Although we can say ‘Mr Burke had capacity’, what
we really mean is that he could formulate a reasoned view about his interests, and ex-
press a settled position on the values that should direct decisions concerning his care.
However, this ‘capacity’ would not of itself equate with determinative decision-making
power.19 As explained in the next section, his values were not the only ones of rele-
vance. In Mr Burke’s case—unlike Ms B’s—the patient’s values alone could not be
determinative because the case concerned a claim for positive intervention, rather than
non-intervention. As such, the Burke qualiﬁcation reﬂects limits to the apparent pa-
tient with capacity’s rights not because of a ﬁnding of ‘mental incapacity’, but because
the basis of medical interventions is not founded on the demands of the patient alone.
In Ms B’s case, the patient’s perspective could prevail as of absolute right because she
demanded non-intervention; there is no correlative absolute right to demand
intervention.
The second qualiﬁcation in regard to ‘patients with capacity’ is found in real-world
treatment of patients’ decision-making: ie how things happen in practice, rather than
how we might imagine they work if we only refer to the letter of the law.20 As
medico-legal scholars are informed by bioethical analyses, it is natural that we speak
to the concept of the ‘autonomous patient’. While at some level this makes sense, not
least as judges also speak to autonomy as a legally protected value, there is not a set-
tled legal deﬁnition of autonomy. Rather, through mental capacity law, we can recog-
nise distinct ‘autonomy type’ concerns coming into play.21 The paradigm case is not
deﬁned by the privileging of a patient’s choice or act of choosing; rather, laws serve to
vindicate her ordering of values and ensuring their application in a determination of
her interests.22 In philosophical terms, medical law is constructed to give effect to the
course of action that best accords with the patient’s second-order preferences; to act
17 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95; MCA s 1(4).
18 Burke (n 7).
19 Philip Bielby, ‘The Conﬂation of Competence and Capacity in English Medical Law: A Philosophical
Critique’ (2005) 8(3) Med Health Care Philos 357.
20 For a full analysis to substantiate the claims made here, see John Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled
Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justiﬁable Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?’ (2007)
15(3) Health Care Anal 235.
21 ibid. See also John Coggon, ‘Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests, and the Patient’s Human Right to a
‘Wholesale Overwhelming of her Autonomy’: A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC (CoP) [2012] HRLR
29’ (2014) 22(1) Med LR 119; John Coggon, ‘Alcohol Dependence and Anorexia Nervosa: Individual
Autonomy and the Jurisdiction of the Court of Protection: An NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014]
EWCOP 35; (2014) 140 BMLR 41’ (2015) 23(4) Med LR 659.
22 Coggon (n 20); Huxtable (n 9); Herring and Wall (n 9).
400 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
in accordance with the values that she, on reﬂection, would endorse as those that are
true for her.23
Both the MCA, and a strong body of case law, support an argument that this con-
cept of autonomy—a ‘best desire autonomy’ that functions to support a system of re-
spectful value pluralism—is the gold standard. However, at times, the courts seem
simply to endorse a patient’s decision as baldly expressed given her current desires,
even if this apparently contradicts what she would, on reﬂection, choose.24 We might
reasonably speculate, for example, that a Jehovah’s Witness would ﬁnd it easier to re-
ceive respect for a consent to a life-preserving blood transfusion than for a refusal of
such consent, notwithstanding that she would not reﬂectively endorse the latter deci-
sion. Furthermore, the law reports demonstrate that some systems of reasoning are
themselves determinative of incapacity, and a patient is held instead to some ideal
standard of decision-making; quintessentially, for example, in the case of patients with
anorexia nervosa whose second-order desires apparently endorse what would be fatal
refusals of nutrition.25 Here, the courts impose a rationality that is external to the pa-
tient: her capacity is, essentially, denied on the basis that the (apparent) irrationality
itself indicates a lack of autonomy, and thus incapacity. In either of these scenarios,
while judges might suggest that the ‘absolute’ right to act irrationally distinguishes the
patient with capacity from the patient who lacks it, in practice constraints are placed
on the rationalities according to which a decision might be made. In blunt terms, pa-
tients are ostensibly free to act irrationally, but in reality only in accordance with an
unspeciﬁed range of ‘irrationalities’. This necessarily tends towards some level of im-
position of ensuring that decisions will be made in accordance with some externally
identiﬁed reasonableness standard: in this sense—if erroneously—there is not an un-
bounded right of choice even in regard to refusals of treatment in English medical
law.26
B. Patients Who Once Had Relevant Capacity, but Now Lack It
The previous discussion suggests that in the paradigm case of medical decision-
making, the patient’s reﬂectively held values are applied to a particular medico-legal
question; having capacity is what means that this may happen. This indicates that con-
sent law reﬂects not unthinking reverence for choice, but respect for the validity of dif-
fering value systems. Such concerns can be applied as we move to consider patients
who once had relevant capacity, but who now lack it. As mental capacity is decision-
speciﬁc, in a narrow sense (absent a sound advance decision to refuse treatment27)
there can be no such thing as an enduringly relevant ‘previous capacity’: a necessary
condition of a ‘capacitous’ decision is that it is being applied contemporaneously.
23 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ (1971) 68(1) J Phil 5; Gerald
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (CUP 1988).
24 For an interesting example, see Re W (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] EWHC 901 (Fam);
[2002] MHLR 411.
25 See eg A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC 1639 (CoP); [2012] HRLR 29; Tony Hope and others,
‘Agency, Ambivalence and Authenticity: The Many Ways in which Anorexia Nervosa Can Affect
Autonomy’ (2013) 9(3) Int JLC 20.
26 For a fuller substantiation and analysis, see Coggon (n 20).
27 As deﬁned in MCA ss 24–26.
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However, as capacity law has been drafted to ensure that we apply where possible the
patients’ own values, we can, where patients lack capacity, decide in accordance with
reasonable inferences on what the patient would consider her best interests to be.
This is not least because of the emphasis given in section 4(6) MCA to ﬁnding and
acting in accordance with the patient’s values.
To act in accordance with the reﬂectively endorsed values of a patient who
once had relevant capacity but now lacks it, we need to establish how these would ap-
ply to the speciﬁc decision. A case that highlights how this would work in practice is
Ahsan28 (this case also debunks erroneous judicial pronouncements that best interests
decisions for patients in vegetative state (VS) will always lead to a ruling in favour of a
life-ending removal of treatment, and thus startlingly will never be apt for a balance
sheet weighing of beneﬁts and burdens).29 Mrs Ahsan was in a VS. Although her case
was decided before the MCA came into force, Judge Hegarty QC, who heard the
case, considered the effect of the Act in his reasoning. Mrs Ahsan was a Muslim,
whose family argued should be treated in accordance with Islamic values; meaning
speciﬁcally that while she would be unaware of it, she should be cared for at home,
with her family. The judge agreed, holding that her best interests, given her values
when she had capacity to formulate them, impacted on how she should be treated
even in a situation where the beneﬁt was both intangible and one of which she would
never be cognisant. That she had not expressed a view on the speciﬁc question was
not relevant: knowledge of her values was sufﬁcient to establish how the particular de-
cision should be made.
C. Patients Whose Values Cannot Be Ascertained
We may contrast the Ahsan-type patient with the patient who lacks capacity and
whose values cannot (satisfactorily) be ascertained. There are three distinct situations
of relevance here. The ﬁrst, which conceptually and legally is straightforward, relates
to patients whose values cannot be established for compelling practical reasons (eg a
patient in an emergency situation, about whom personally little or nothing is known).
Secondly, there are patients who as a matter of fact never held (relevant) reﬂectively
endorsed values that can be applied in the circumstances. And thirdly, there are pa-
tients who lack capacity, and whose current values are in conﬂict with their previously
held values: section 4(6) MCA requires decision-makers to consider ‘the person’s
past and present wishes and feelings’, but offers no indication of what to do when
these are inconsistent. While the ﬁrst situation here does not require elaboration, I
will discuss the second and third in turn.
Patients who never held (relevant) values can be exempliﬁed through analysis of
the case of Re Y.30 This concerned a woman who lived in an institution, and possessed
extremely limited awareness and understanding. Connell J found a means of holding
28 Ahsan v University Hospitals Leicester NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 2624 (QB); [2007] PIQR P19.
29 At para 35 of Re M (n 3), Baker J states that: ‘In vegetative state cases, the balance falls in one direction in
every case—in favour of withdrawal.’ The apparent confusion here likely results from the court’s conﬂating
a universal comment on patients’ best interests with an observation born of the general truth that when
health care teams, with family support, apply to the courts for an application on the lawfulness of withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment, that this will be granted.
30 Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110.
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that Ms Y’s best interests were served by her submitting to the painful process of be-
ing a bone marrow donor, so that she might help save the life of her sister. He did so
in part by imputing speciﬁc values to the patient, holding that because Ms Y’s family
could be said collectively to espouse the sort of values that would support a decision
to donate, Ms Y herself could be said to do so. Despite such judicial reasoning, in Y,
we ﬁnd a patient who cannot in any concrete sense be said to have previously (or cur-
rently) held values that can be drawn on and applied in reaching a decision that ac-
cords, as best possible, with what she would have reﬂectively endorsed as serving her
interests. As such, the application of section 4(6) to such a patient now would either
be impossible, or anyway a more complex question than in the more straightforward
situation exempliﬁed by Ahsan.
Moving to patients whose past and present values conﬂict, we are presented with
still thornier conceptual, legal, and ethical problems. As indicated, the MCA gives little
help in adjudicating between the patient’s own inconsistent views. Legal rules regard-
ing anticipatory decision-making suggest that a patient’s more recent values should be
prioritised if there is a conﬂict or apparent change over time.31 Equally, in cases of un-
certainty, the dominant rule at law is that decision-making should err on the side of
life. Consider the sort of patient represented by Ronald Dworkin’s ﬁctional Margo,
who suffered dementia and as a result lived a contented life, but not one that her ‘for-
mer self’ would have recognised as part of her ‘biography’.32 While in Dworkin’s argu-
ment Margo’s previous values should be determinative, and lead to a life-ending
decision, at law the weight of argument suggests that her current values should be pri-
oritised. In the class of patient exempliﬁed in this article by Ahsan, there is a robust ra-
tionale for applying previously held, patient-speciﬁc values, even while metaphysicists
might raise questions about the link between the ‘previous-’ and ‘current person’.33
The complexities with a patient who lacks capacity, and whose past and present values
conﬂict, mean that it would not be straightforward to consider her in the same cate-
gory as Ahsan: for current purposes, it cannot be argued that such a patient should be
treated simply according to her previous, reﬂectively endorsed values. However, there
is considerable further analysis to be done in relation to that question, beyond the
scope of this article.34
I I I . CONCEPTUAL CLARITY TWO: THE ‘OWNERSHIP’
OF MEDICAL DECISIONS
In linking the previous and the current sections, it bears reemphasising the following:
regard for autonomy within capacity law is best conceived as being about respecting a
patient’s determination of her interests by reference to her reﬂectively endorsed val-
ues, rather than a more skeletal, non-substantive reverence for bare choice in and of it-
self. I have alluded to the courts’ concern for patients’ weighting—and then
weighing—of reasons, and discussed the subtlety of respecting patients’ values when
31 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam); [2003] 2 FLR 408; MCA s 25(2)(c).
32 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (Alfred Knopf 1993) 218–37.
33 Cf Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing–Problems at the Margins of Life (OUP 2002).
34 I am grateful to Neil Allen for pushing the importance of this point and highlighting the need for further at-
tention to be given to the important questions raised by the law here.
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making ﬁndings of incapacity. The law’s paradigmatic position asks that we attempt to
apply the patient’s reﬂectively endorsed values, whether these are inferred directly by
asking for consent (in the case of a patient with capacity) or drawn through inferences
given facts that can be determined about a patient’s values by other means (in the
case of a patient who lacks, but once had, relevant capacity).35 In either case, of them-
selves, the patient’s values should not themselves be displaced at law.
Insofar as the courts have provided any sort of qualiﬁcation to this (and the fact
that they have done so reinforces the view that their concern is with the application of
endorsed personal values rather than bare reverence for choice), it may be said to be
based on some robust idea of rational scrutiny. For example, a belief that one’s blood
is evil,36 or that one should not consume calories,37 have been found to be inadequate
bases on which a patient might assess her interests when deciding whether to give or
withhold consent. If theoretically various questions are begged in this approach,38 it is
at least something that judges acknowledge. Jackson J, for example, states in A Local
Authority v E that:
I acknowledge that a person with severe anorexia may be in a Catch 22 situation
regarding capacity: namely, that by deciding not to eat, she proves that she lacks
capacity to decide at all.39
In that same case, the judge also applies in his reasoning the perspective on best inter-
ests that the patient would, in his view, have espoused had her life been different. He
looks for (what he, at least, sees as) the better understood, rationally endorsed patient
perspective on her interests: Ms E had started, but failed to complete, a degree in
medicine, and Jackson J thought it relevant to note the salience of the value system
she might have held had she become a doctor.40
Overall, there is good reason to understand mental capacity law as premised on a
commitment to understanding patients in a way that incorporates respect for endorsed
values; patients’ perspectives on what serves their interests. However, there are some
constraints on what values the courts are willing also to endorse. And crucially, it does
not follow from the commitment to patient-centredness that a treatment should be
given simply because a patient wants it, or it is found that she would want it if she had
capacity. We thus need a clear understanding of the law’s framing of the medical deci-
sion, which will then allow us to question judicial attempts to drive a wedge between
law’s treatment of patients who have, and patients who lack, capacity.
35 See also the analysis in John Coggon,What Makes Health Public? (CUP 2012), ch 10.
36 X NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam); [2005] 1 All
ER 387.
37 A Local Authority v E (n 25).
38 Coggon, ‘Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests, and the Patient’s Human Right to a ‘Wholesale Overwhelming
of her Autonomy’ ’ (n 21).
39 A Local Authority v E (n 25), para 53.
40 ibid, paras 78–79.
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A. ‘Ownership’ of Medical Decisions
There is a detailed legal literature on the ‘anatomy’ of medical decision-making, from
Ian Kennedy’s early framing of the ﬁeld,41 through Penney Lewis’s study in the crimi-
nal law setting,42 to a wider-reaching contemporary scholarship pioneered by scholars
including Sara Fovargue and Alex Mullock.43 Rather than answer here the general
question ‘what is a medical decision?’44, my aim is to deconstruct the idea of medical
decision-making by reference to speciﬁc ‘stakeholders’ and their relative ‘ownership’
of a decision’s different components.
To identify the stakeholders, it is useful to revisit Burke. Lord Phillips, in the Court
of Appeal, stated that:
The proposition that the patient has a paramount right to refuse treatment
is amply demonstrated by the authorities. . . . The corollary does not, how-
ever, follow, at least as a general proposition. Autonomy and the right of
self-determination do not entitle the patient to insist on receiving a particu-
lar medical treatment regardless of the nature of the treatment. Insofar as a
doctor has a legal obligation to provide treatment this cannot be founded
simply upon the fact that the patient demands it. The source of the duty lies
elsewhere.45
These dicta, if cryptic, are consistent with settled legal principle. English law, in its de-
fault, protects patients from interference: lawful reason is required before it is permis-
sible to breach a person’s bodily integrity. Depending on the circumstance, different
legal criteria need to be met before a person’s bodily integrity may be breached.
Consent may be one such criterion. But in many circumstances consent alone is insuf-
ﬁcient to justify intervention. The sorts of interventions that might occur within
health care are subject to the ‘medical exception’: ie they are prima facie unlawful acts
that are permissible because it is in the public interest to allow them to happen.46 As
Richard Huxtable shows, there may be a requirement of consent, but this is not ade-
quate to explain the concept of the lawful medical intervention.47 To understand the
‘stakeholders’ within a lawful decision to provide health care, and explain the interac-
tion and nature of their respective stakes, Huxtable’s analysis leads to the following
triad (which does not directly reﬂect his own presentation of the ideas, but which fol-
lows from his analysis).
41 Ian Kennedy, ‘What is a Medical Decision?’ in Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Ethics in Medical Law and
Ethics (Clarendon Press 1988).
42 Penney Lewis, ‘The Medical Exception’ (2012) 65 CLP 355.
43 Sara Fovargue and Alexendra Mullock (eds), The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the Medical
Exception (Routledge 2015).
44 This question is examined more fully in John Coggon, ‘Comments and Reﬂections on “Proper Medical
Treatment”: A Case for Coherent Inconsistency’ in ibid.
45 Burke (n 7), para 31.
46 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL).
47 Huxtable (n 9).
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For treatment to be lawful it is requisite that:
• It is established to reﬂect, or at least be consistent with, the patient’s personal view of
her interests: this may be established through gaining consent, or by reference to pro-
ven facts about the patient’s values.
• It is judged by reference to professional opinion to be in the patient’s best interests:
this will be established by reference to the doctor(s) agreeing that the intervention is
indicated as a worthwhile intervention because of the beneﬁts—whether therapeutic
or otherwise—that it will provide.48
• It is judged, by reference to principles of sound public decision-making, to be worth
funding through the health care system: this will be established by the particular re-
source allocation model that governs access to treatment.49
Judges may not be explicit about this basis for lawful provision of health care (not
least as each component may not require a legal determination in a given case). But
each of these clusters is a necessary component of lawful medical decision-making.
For receipt or provision of treatment, patient-centred care does not equate with care
being deﬁned simply by reference to the patient’s personal values. While Ms B’s case
exempliﬁes a purely patient-centred right to refuse treatment, Mr Burke’s case and its
surrounding doctrine exposes how more is at play than patient autonomy when we
look to positive medical decision-making. Baroness Hale is clear about this in Aintree,
and thereby of the equivalent situations of patients who have and who lack capacity:
The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the patient’s
point of view. That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than
those of a fully capable patient must prevail. We cannot always have what we
want. Nor will it always be possible to ascertain what an incapable patient’s
wishes are. [. . .] But in so far as it is possible to ascertain the patient’s wishes
and feelings, his beliefs and values or the things which were important to him, it
is those which should be taken into account because they are a component in
making the choice which is right for him as an individual human being.50
This analysis, placing the patient’s perspective as a component of a wider determina-
tion of what might be a viable medical decision positions itself in happy consonance
with how the General Medical Council frames medical decision-making as a joint en-
terprise, involving ‘patients and doctors making decisions together’.51 Perhaps espe-
cially within the context of publicly funded health care, there is recognition of a need
to defer to doctors’ expertise; for treatment to be warranted in their expert judgment.
This concern, as Huxtable suggests, rests both on the need for patients not to be able
48 Aintree (n 8); paras 37–41 (Lady Hale), where it is made clear that a broad understanding of welfare re-
quires that doctors include in an evaluation of treatment its non-therapeutic beneﬁts in an assessment of its
efﬁcacy and worth.
49 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; [2015] 2 WLR 768, para 75.
50 Aintree (n 8), para 45.
51 General Medical Council, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (GMC 2008).
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to demand that doctors cause them harm,52 and on a need to ensure that resources
are used as effectively as possible. A patient might understand the properties and ef-
fects of morphine, and come to the view that it would serve her best interests to take
it. It does not follow that on the basis of her determination her doctor is—or should
be—legally obliged to prescribe it!
So, while the metaphor is crude, we can picture the ‘ownership’ of a medical deci-
sion by reference to who has a stake in it. If it is non-intervention or a choice between
different offered treatments, in principle at least, we can look simply to the patient’s
values: this might be through asking for her consent (as eg in the case of Ms B) or by
reference to what we know about the patient (eg we would know not to provide a
blood transfusion to a patient who lacks capacity if we knew that she was a committed
Jehovah’s Witness). If it is to establish which potential treatments might be offered,
the doctor as an expert in medicine, and the state as a provider and distributor of lim-
ited resources, also hold stakes: here, we look to the need of the patient, as judged ‘ex-
ternally’, and to what might be available as a viably funded treatment.
B. The Value Basis of Decisions: Clarity on the Parity Between
Patients with and without Capacity
The analysis thus far has explained the ‘shape’ of different patients within mental ca-
pacity law, and outlined the ‘ownership’ of medical decisions through reference to the
stakeholders in them. We can conclude this section by advancing some overall foun-
dational premises for the critical argument advanced below.
The concept of the patient with capacity—the ‘autonomous’ or ‘competent
patient’—is sometimes one whose standing is overstated.53 ‘Absolute’ rights of non-
interference do not translate into absolute rights to claim, either against doctors in the
face of contrary (and reasonable) professional judgment, or against the state in the
face of lawful resource allocation decisions. The better understanding of the function
of receiving consent, especially in a system that looks to patient values and ensured
patient understanding,54 is that it allows the patient to explain from a personal per-
spective what does or does not serve her interests. Finally, we have seen that the ‘ab-
solute’ deference offered to patient’s reasons, be they rational or irrational, is not
always reﬂected in case law: patients may not obviously fail the MCA tests for capac-
ity, and yet may still be found to lack decision-making capacity.
The various conceptual subtleties presented above allow us to see a parity that is
not always obvious between patients who have capacity and those who now lack, but
once had, relevant capacity. With Aintree, we have authority at the highest level that pa-
tients’ applicable values survive their loss of capacity and require to be respected over
and above any claims about ‘objective medical interests’. Baroness Hale rejects the legal
construction of a ‘reasonable patient’ whose interests apply in any case of incapacity55;
52 Consider this requirement too in the light of discussions such as Jose´ Miola’s analysis of conscience in
health care: Jose´ Miola, ‘Making Decisions about Decision-Making: Conscience, Regulation, and the Law’
(2015) 23(2) Med LR 263.
53 Cf Charles Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Hart
2009).
54 Montgomery (n 49).
55 Aintree (n 8), para 45.
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a point to which we return in Section IV. With section 4(6) MCA, and the common
law developments regarding patients who lack capacity, there is a great emphasis on
the need to weigh factors in accordance with patients’ pre-existing values. The overall
situation suggests that within the legal framing of the medical decision, the patient-
centred component is aimed at safeguarding—and to the extent that is compatible
with professional judgment and resource allocation concerns, vindicating—the pa-
tient’s reﬂectively endorsed perspective. Patient-centred decision-making protects pa-
tients’ values whether they have or lack capacity, and it does so in a framing that in part
accepts that patients’ interests are deﬁned speciﬁcally by reference to their own values.
The outlier in law’s framing of patients, therefore, is not ‘the incompetent patient’ as
contrasted with the ‘competent patient’. Rather, the difﬁculties come with patients whose
values cannot be ascertained, be that because of an emergency situation, because of the pa-
tient never having had or demonstrated applicable values, or because of an internal conﬂict
of personal values. But for patients who once had, and now lack, relevant capacity, this
problem does not arise. As such, it might be argued that the onus is on the decision-maker
to establish that the patient’s values should be set aside if that is her view. However, the
Court of Protection has developed a problematic situation wherein the rights of people
who lack capacity have been weakened. The following section responds to this.
IV . TOWARDS LEGAL CLARITY ON MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING
My argument now responds to developing Court of Protection ‘wisdoms’, highlight-
ing three related areas of judicial reasoning. I ﬁrst question the ongoing application of
Bland56 in contemporary judicial reasoning. I then consider concerns that decision-
making for patients who lack capacity risks wrongfully becoming a substituted judg-
ment test. Finally, I explore the apparent apprehension that if subjectivity seeps into
decision-making for patients who lack capacity, this undermines demands to look to
‘objective best interests’.
A. Best Interests: No Longer a Bland Idea
A deﬁning feature of medical jurisprudence is the extent to which it is a product of
evolving judge-made law.57 Historical landmark cases in health care law are often bare
on legal authority, draw explicitly from non-legal norms (eg ones derived from medi-
cal understandings or public reports), and explicitly tweak and enhance the dominant
rules, standards, and principles as time goes on. For example, consider how Thorpe J
provided the test for incapacity in Re C. The legal authority comes from just Bland
and Re F58 (neither of which concerns a patient whose incapacity was in doubt), Re T,
and the judge draws explicitly from a model of capacity advanced by a medical profes-
sional. Or consider the development of negligence-based protections of informed con-
sent, culminating in the botch-job ratio of Chester v Afshar59 and the more
straightforward, if distinctly radical, decision inMontgomery.60
56 Bland (n 11).
57 Kenneth Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (Ashgate 2007).
58 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
59 Chester v Afshar [2004] 4 All ER 587.
60 Montgomery (n 49).
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This characteristic of medical law as a judge-led ﬁeld is remarkable in part
because—in Kenneth Veitch’s framing61—it represents a claiming of ‘jurisdiction’ by
the courts to determine matters of professional and ethical importance. The courts
have assumed authority and developed rules and principles of governance in response
to advancing medical possibility and evolving social and ethical norms. But it is more
remarkable still because while medical law may be deﬁned by reference to the central
role of judges, it also repeatedly offers challenges to standard understandings of con-
straints on judicial decision-making. This applies in relation both to statutory interpre-
tation and the application of precedent authority.
For example, Quintavalle62 is literally a textbook illustration of ‘purposive’ judicial
reasoning, given to ﬁrst year law students to demonstrate judicial departure from lit-
eral readings of statutes.63 And regarding common law developments, we see that
higher court decisions come to stand as formally good, but practically bad, law.
Strikingly, the law governing best interests is pre-eminent in this regard. Best interests
began as a very ‘Bolam-esque’ idea; in Re F and Bland it is doubly medicalised, in es-
sence eliding ‘best interests’ and ‘best medical interests’, and offering a standard whose
substantive content is largely left to the judgment of medical experts. Through devel-
opments in the late 1990s and 2000s, however, judges pushed away from both fea-
tures of medicalisation. In their place, a patient-focused standard emerged comprising
the ‘Bolam’ aspect (ie, in practitioners’ expert judgment, is the treatment clinically in-
dicated?) but also a fuller concern for interests beyond those that are medical. And
with this development, the courts produced a reframing that denied the place of doc-
tors as the ﬁnal or necessarily best judges of best interests.64
Bland of course remained ‘good law’ even while the ﬂesh it had put on the bones
of best interests was stripped away and a substantively distinct body of legal rules was
created. So formally, to the extent that it is consistent with by the MCA, Bland still
stands. Yet the development of the substantive idea of best interests clearly shows,
over time, a radical reformulation of the standard explicated in Bland. While the
rationes of that case, narrowly conceived, might endure, much of the detail and nuance
of emphasis simply do not. The judicially created, patient-centred best interests stan-
dard that emerged over time, focusing on the values of the patient, and her global
rather than just her medical interests, is distinct from the judicial framing of best inter-
ests in Bland, and rests on alternatively conceived foundations.
I therefore suggest that when judges, health care practitioners, and other decision-
makers wish to substantiate an understanding of best interests, or apply the standard,
it is wrong for them to have recourse to the detail of dicta in Bland. Controversial as
such a claim must appear, my argument is ﬁrst that Bland’s narrow understanding of
best interests at common law became redundant through legal evolution. And perhaps
more compellingly, the MCA necessarily renders the earlier standard inapplicable,
and replaces it with a fuller, richer, less bland, alternative. Even if lower-courts’ judicial
61 Veitch (n 57).
62 R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health (2003) 2 All ER 113.
63 See eg Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System—16th edn (Routledge 2015) 98–101.
64 See especially Re Y (n 30); Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193; Re S (Adult
Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15; An NHS Trust v A, SA [2005] EWCA Civ 1145; Ahsan (n 28).
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law-making does not strictly undermine the force of Bland, the MCA necessarily does
so. Bland is perhaps medical law’s landmark case, but its substantive explication of
principle is, in a very real legal sense, outdated. When the Court of Protection
approaches questions of best interests, it must do so with the more patient-centred
idea, rather than purport to have serious recourse to understandings that have long
been set aside both by judges and by Parliament.
B. When Words Collide: Overcoming Concerns
about ‘Substituted Judgment’
To highlight my concerns about the problematic application of Bland, I will focus on
Baker J’s reasoning in M on how best interests must be distinguished from a substi-
tuted judgment standard. His decision builds directly on Lewison J’s in P, advancing
the position, essentially, that it cannot make sense to allow the parity that I have de-
scribed above between patients who have capacity, and those who once had relevant
capacity. Baker J holds:
Lord Goff stated [in Bland] at p 871, that the so-called ‘substituted judgment’ test
adopted in most American courts—whereby ‘the court seeks, in a case in which
the patient is incapacitated from expressing any view on the question whether life-
prolonging treatment should be withheld in the relevant circumstances, to deter-
mine what decision the patient himself would have made had he been able to do
so’—did not form part of English law in relation to incompetent adults ‘on whose
behalf nobody has power to give consent to medical treatment’.65
He continues later in the judgment:
It is important to note that, while any decision-maker, including a judge, is under
an obligation to consider P’s [the patient’s] wishes and feelings, and the beliefs,
values and other factors he would have taken into account if he had capacity, the
decision must be based on P’s best interests and not on what P would have de-
cided if he had capacity.66
Baker J argues that this view is supported by the reasoning of Lewison J in P, the ex-
planatory notes of the original Mental Capacity Bill, and Lord Goff’s dicta in Bland.
He also refers to the MCA Code of Practice, which ‘conﬁrmed’, he reasons that we
cannot in a best interests evaluation focus on what the patient would have decided.
The crucial lines within the passage that he quotes from the Code are:
[The patient’s] wishes and feelings, beliefs and values will not necessarily be the
deciding factor in working out their best interests. [. . . T]he ﬁnal decision must
be based entirely on what is in the person’s best interests.67
65 Re M (n 3), para 71.
66 ibid, para 81.
67 The passage from which the judge is quoting is found in Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental
Capacity Act 2005—Code of Practice (TSO 2007), para 5.38.
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Baker J’s reasoning has superﬁcial appeal, but is ﬂawed. First, as I have indicated,
strong reliance on substantive claims advanced in Bland are problematic: Lord Goff
explicated principle in a way that is not even reﬂected in subsequent common law de-
velopments, and whose effect is negated by the MCA. For the reasons presented in
the previous section, we should doubt the reliance that may be given to substantive
components of many dicta in Bland. Demedicalising developments at common law,
and then in the MCA, provide compelling reason not to have determinative recourse
to an explication of the best interests standard that no longer holds. Secondly, and
equally, at law the notes of the original Mental Capacity Bill are not determinative. A
judge might refer to them for whatever persuasive force they may have, and we see be-
low that Lady Hale draws from them too in her opinion in Aintree.68 But they are in
no hard way a constraint on best interests determinations, and where they conﬂict
with a proper reading of the law as subsequently enacted, their force is to be ques-
tioned. Thirdly, and perhaps the most important point here, which rests on the analy-
sis in Sections II and III of this article, is that Baker J apparently misunderstands the
passage that he takes from the Code of Practice, which aligns itself with a distinct un-
derstanding to that attributed to Lord Goff’s. Lord Goff’s point, as cited by Baker J, is
that English law provided no means of introducing a substituted judgment. The Code
of Practice, by contrast, is explaining a separate point: that a best interests decision is
informed by, but not only by, the patient’s values.
To explain this third point more fully, recall how the above analysis shows that a
patient’s views on her interests will not necessarily be determinative of what treatment
is ultimately administered. Yet that analysis showed that this is true for patients with
capacity too. As we have seen, a positive medical decision is best conceived as com-
prising a combination of three perspectives on what serves the patient’s best interests:
her own, reﬂectively endorsed view, the professional’s expert view, and the public in-
terest view. So for any patient, personal values cannot be said necessarily to be the de-
ciding factor. Baker J’s reasoning represents a misunderstanding of the medical
decision, which leads to an illusory distinction between patients who have and pa-
tients who lack capacity, and provides an undue licence then to disregard the patient’s
own values in order to assert the pre-eminence of some externally preferred value (in
the case ofM, the imposition of a rigid sanctity of life ethic69).
Two further points may be noted here. First, scholarly analyses of best interests and
substituted judgment standards demonstrate that each of these terms designates a wide
range of often overlapping ideas. John Phillips and David Wendler present a useful con-
ceptual analysis of substituted judgment, and a defence of their preferred understanding.70
In their argument, we ﬁnd claims about necessary distinctions between best interests and
substituted judgment. However, given my analysis above, I would doubt that what some
protagonists label ‘substituted judgment’ is not conceptually identical to what others desig-
nate ‘best interests’. Depending on how it is cashed out, the patient-centred decision-
68 See text to n 73.
69 See Richard Huxtable, ‘ ‘In a Twilight World’? Judging the Value of Life for the Minimally Conscious
Patient’ (2013) 39(9) JME 565.
70 John Phillips and David Wendler, ‘Clarifying Substituted Judgement: The Endorsed Life Approach’ (2014)
41(9) JME 723.
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making standard described in this article for patients who lack but once had relevant ca-
pacity could as comfortably be labelled best interests as substituted judgment. Overall, the
substance here is more important than making a distraction of the label.
A key reason, though, that we might prefer the label ‘best interests’ is regard to patients
whose values cannot be ascertained. For them, the parity that I have outlined with patients
who have capacity does not exist. As explained above, this may be because we do not
know anything about the patient personally, because the patient simply never had the ca-
pacity to formulate the relevant values, or because she espouses inconsistent values. In any
such case, purporting to apply the patient’s endorsed values—to provide a substituted
judgment—would be an exercise in ﬁction.71 So without getting too distracted by labels,
we can see why best interests could be the more appropriate term, while also accepting
that where it is possible, it should operate as a substituted judgment test that applies the
reﬂectively endorsed values that the patient would bring to the decision-making.
This position is consistent with Lady Hale’s analysis in Aintree. As she states:
The advantage of a best interests test was that it focused on the patient as an in-
dividual, rather than the conduct of the doctor, and took all the circumstances,
both medical and non-medical, into account. . . . But best interests should also
contain ‘a strong element of “substituted judgment” ’ . . . taking into account
both the past and present wishes of the patient as an individual, and also the fac-
tors which he would consider if able to do so . . . . This might include ‘altruistic
sentiments and concern for others’. . . . This is, as the Explanatory Notes to the
Bill made clear, still a “best interests” rather than a “substituted judgment” test,
but one which accepts that the preferences of the person concerned are an im-
portant component in deciding where his best interests lie.72
And as she goes on to hold:
[I]n considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular
time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medi-
cal but social and psychological . . . they must try and put themselves in the
place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or
would be likely to be.73
These dicta support and are supported by the analysis that I have provided throughout
this article. There is, however, one key point of at least apparent discord between my
analysis and Lady Hale’s presentation of the framing that mental capacity law gives to
patients, respectively, with and without capacity. This comes out in her discussion of
‘unwise’ decisions. Lady Hale holds that:
A person who has the capacity to decide for himself can of course make deci-
sions which are not in his own best interests and no doubt frequently does so.
71 See also Louise Harmon, ‘Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment’
(1990) 100(1) Yale LJ 1.
72 Aintree (n 8), para 24.
73 ibid, para 39.
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Indeed, the Act provides that a person is not to be treated as unable to make a
decision simply because he makes an unwise one: section 1(4). But both at com-
mon law and under the Act, those who act or make decisions on behalf of a per-
son who lacks capacity must do so in his best interests: section 1(5).74
While there is intuitive appeal to the reasoning here, it becomes apparent that the
ideas that are expressed are not straightforward. First, Lady Hale’s suggestion that a
person with capacity might act against her best interests relates to an alternative con-
cept of best interests: a patient with capacity may act in a way that is in some senses
harmful, but the crucial point is that insofar as they are applicable, the decision is re-
spected because an overall understanding of her interests is informed by reference to
the application of her values to the decision. This is no different for patients who lack,
but once had, relevant capacity. So a Jehovah’s Witness, whether he has or lacks capac-
ity, may see effected the ‘unwise’ decision, which many would say is ‘not in his own
best interests’, not to receive a blood transfusion. But within law’s framing, as ex-
plained above, this is precisely about understanding the patient’s values as being incor-
porated within an assessment of his interests, regardless of whether he has or lacks
capacity. In other words, the way best interests has come to be constructed at law
does, in effect, mean that patients with capacity are being treated in their best inter-
ests. It is hard to see, in short, how or why the statutory language suggests that a ‘wise’
decision and a ‘best interests’ decision are somehow synonymous: an ‘unwise’ decision
may well be precisely what serves a patient’s best interests in the sense that legal prin-
ciple would have us understand that standard.
As such, and consistently with Lady Hale’s wider analysis in Aintree, I have argued
that there should be parity in mental capacity law’s treatment of patients’ values, if these
can be established, regardless of whether they currently have or lack capacity. A conse-
quence of this, and the overall dissection of the concept of the medical decision, is that it
is proper to understand decision-making for patients who have capacity as being about
an assessment of their overall best interests, given the combination of their personal val-
ues, the clinical judgment, and the public interest. As a matter of law, patient-centred
care requires a determination on best interests that incorporates the values of the patient
who lacks capacity, where possible, as fully as would be the case for a patient who has ca-
pacity: the only difference is the route taken to establishing what those values are.
C. Reconciling Subjectivity and ‘Objective Best Interests’
Against what has been argued, a further means of problematising the more patient-
centred approach to best interests lies in arguments that best interests is an
objective—not a subjective—standard. As such, the apparent logic suggests, it would
be erroneous to focus on the values of the subject (ie the patient) and we should in-
stead look to objective (ie ‘true’) values.75
We might begin by noting that in Aintree Lady Hale holds that the standard should
indeed be patient-focused, stating: ‘[With the idea] that the test of the patient’s wishes
and feelings was an objective one, what the reasonable patient would think, again I
74 ibid, para 23.
75 See eg Lewison J’s reﬂections in Re P (n 1), para 37 and Baker J’s in Re M (n 3), para 81.
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respectfully disagree.’76 In advancing a justiﬁcation of this position, I would endorse
Lady Hale’s reasoning, which is spelled out above.77 And I would supplement Lady
Hale’s argument with a further point about the role of ‘objectivity’. The demands to
ﬁnd what is objectively in the patient’s best interests should not be equated with a de-
mand to ﬁnd some monistic, universal value and apply it to the individual just because
she lacks capacity. Indeed, the idea that such a value exists within medical law stands
at odds with its clear and settled value-agnosticism.78 The objectivity that the courts
should be aiming at obtains in making a ﬁnding of fact about what the patient’s rele-
vant, endorsed, subjective values are.79
Assume, for example, that a court establishes as a matter of fact that a patient was a
committed Jehovah’s Witness. It follows from this that, objectively, it is not in her best in-
terests to receive blood. This is not because it is objectively true that people should not
‘consume’ blood. Rather, the court makes its ﬁnding on best interests on the basis of an
objectively veriﬁable understanding of the subjective values of the patient: it is an objec-
tive fact that the patient’s values are incompatible with receiving the transfusion. This is
consistent with the patient-centred approach advanced by Lady Hale, but makes clearer
why it is wrong for judges to impose external values (such as a sanctity of life ethic) on
the simplistic basis that such positions are ‘objective’.
V. CONCLUSIONS: ACHIEVING PATIENT-CENTRED PRACTICE
WITHIN EXISTING MENTAL CAPACITY LAW
The above analysis has been advanced in a conceptual and theoretical voice, but draws
ultimately from standards, rules, and principles found at law. To argue that the law
provides an ethically desirable standard for decision-making would require its own
sustained analysis. It is worth noting, however, that all of the above can be seen to rest
upon a principled commitment to respecting and accommodating value pluralism: a
cardinal ethico-legal feature within the evolving canons of medical law. More compel-
lingly, what this article shows is that, without revision, English mental capacity law de-
mands that decision-makers take patient-centred approaches in all cases, giving parity
to the determinative strength of a patient’s own values, if these can be established,
whether she has, or lacks, capacity. The target of my critique is erroneous interpreta-
tion and application of the law, rather than the law itself. My argument, founded on
an explanation of the ‘shape’ that law gives to patients and medical decision-making,
provides a legally and conceptually robust understanding and framework for mental
capacity law cases. The core concern in patient-centred health care and law is the vin-
dication of patients’ endorsed values; not a fetishisation of choice, or a concomitant
neglect of personal values where choice is not possible. As we have seen, patients’ val-
ues, whether they have or lack capacity, are not all that is relevant. But patients’ values,
alongside professional and public judgment, must be taken seriously.
76 Aintree (n 8), para 45.
77 See quoted text to n 50.
78 Coggon (n 9).
79 John Coggon, ‘Best Interests, Public Interest, and the Power of the Medical Profession’ (2008) 16(3)
Health Care Anal 219.
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